Asymmetry in Wholesale-Retail Food Price Transmission in an African Metropolitan Area: The Case of Kinshasa (Zaire) by Minten, Bart & Kyle, Steven C.
95-09
 
Staff Paper 
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-7801 USA 
Asymmetry In Wholesale - Retail Food Price Transmission 
In An African Metropolitan Area: 
The Case Of Kinshasa (Zaire) 
Bart Minten
 
and
 
Steven Kyle
 
September 1995 
-

... 
It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support equality 
of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be 
denied admission to any educational program or activity or be 
denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited dis­
crimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, 
color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or '~ 
handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will 
of such equality of opportunity. 
assure the continuation 
.. 
Asymmetry In Wholesale· Retail Food Price Transmission 
In An African Metropolitan Area: 
The Case Of Kinshasa (Zaire)" 
Bart Minten
 
and
 
Steven Kyle
 
September 1995
 
-

" Thanks to David Sahn, Eric Tollens, and Lois Willett for their insights and helpful 
comments. 
ABSTRACT 
This study presents a new explanation ofasymmetric price behavior infood markets based 
on the presence of transactions costs, and provides evidence from a developing country. Price 
liberalization can in many cases be insufficient for efficient operation ofAfrican food markets. 
This is mainly due to the existence of significant transactions costs, caused by deficient 
infrastructure and information systems. A model based on search costs and kinked demand curves 
is used to explain asymmetric price behavior in retail markets in Kinshasa (Zaire). 
-
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, structural adjustment and price liberalization programs 
in agricultural and food markets have been implemented in most African countries. Among 
other objectives, price liberalization was designed to encourage competition among traders and 
abandonment of the frequent practice of imposing official government prices for agricultural 
products. It was hoped that liberalization would permit efficient operation of markets with 
consequent improvements in resource allocation and welfare. However, agricultural markets 
still suffer from deficiencies and private traders are often perceived as unscrupulous speculators 
although they may have ample justification for their margins. 
One of the explanations is the existence of transaction costs. It has recently been argued 
that transaction costs are more important in developing countries than in developed countries 
(Klitgaard, 1991; Thorbecke, 1992; de Janvry et al., 1992; Staatz et al., 1993) 1. This is especially 
the case in the marketing sector. Because of poor information, this sector is often much larger 
than necessary and entrepreneurial talent is tied up in transacting rather than producing. In 
most Sub-Saharan countries, there is a pervasive lack of infrastructure, both physical and 
institutional, and the legal system is typically weak and often counterproductive. This creates 
an environment where information is not a free good and customers and traders face 
1 Arguments are: large and significant cultural differences; greater quality variation in 
developing countries and fewer available screening signals of the true quality of an item; the 
greater incidence ofpoverty and the more unequal distribution of wealth what implies that the 
-
use of collaterals as a substitute for information is restricted; high uncenainty about future 
production, afunction ofunpredictable weather, and govemment and donor policies; andfinally, .. 
unreliable contract enforcement mechanisms. 
1 
significant opportunity costs when collecting information on prices, costs and other market 
conditions. 
The focus of this paper is on asymmetric price behavior, i.e. the different transmission 
of price increases compared to decreases, in the retail markets of Kinshasa (Zaire). The 
contribution is two-fold. 
First, it offers an alternative explanation for asymmetry through a model based on 
transactions costs. Previous explanations are based on industry concentration and government 
intervention (Hall et al., 1981). In the first case, food retailers are said to have sufficient market 
power to pass cost increases through to consumers rapidly while not passing price decreases 
on to consumers, thereby retaining a larger margin as excess profits. Another explanation for 
asymmetric behavior is given by Kinnucan and Forker (1987). Wholesale - retail price 
transmission elasticities differ depending on whether observed changes in the marketing margin 
are caused by retail level demand shifts for food or wholesale level supply shifts for the 
agricultural product. If strictly cost-push elements are the cause, wholesale-retail price 
transmission is shown to be smaller in numerical value than if strictly demand pull forces are 
at work. 
Second, it measures asymmetric responses in retail price transmission of a developing 
country market. Previous analyses are confined to strongly regulated American agricultural 
markets (Hall et al., 1981; Ward, 1982; Bailey, Brorsen, 1982; Kinnucan, Forker, 1987; Hahn, 
1990; Pick et al., 1990; Hansmire, Willett, 1993). These results indicate that retail prices in 
dairy markets appear to behave asymmetrically but it seems not to be a widespread 
• 
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phenomenon in other markets. Hahn's results suggest that asymmetry is especially important 
in retail price adjustments. 
However, none of these explanations seem satisfactory in African retail markets. First, 
it is difficult to maintain that high industry concentration describes food retailing. Many 
people are involved in food retailing and entry and exit barriers seem to be very small. Second, 
government intervention in the pricing of agricultural commodities after structural adjustment 
is limited but although prices are liberalized, the legal framework is often not very well 
adapted. Third, the existence of inventories is normally expected to neutralize the effect of 
demand shifts, because stocks and not prices would be affected (Kinnucan, Forker, 1987). The 
structure of the paper is as follows. First, a model based on search costs is developed. Then, 
data sources and estimation procedures are explained. In a fourth section, the empirical results 
from Zaire are presented. The paper finishes with conclusions and policy implications. 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A model specification much used in marketing margin studies is the mark-up model 
(Gardner, 1975; Heien, 1980). This model permits margins to consist of either absolute or 
percentage markups or a percentage thereof. The model can be written as: 
R ::; .ttW,Z) 
where R is the retail price, W is the wholesale price and Z is a vector representing marketing 
inputs. The foundation of the markup pricing model rests on the hypothesis that prices of • 
agricultural products and other inputs at lower levels of the marketing system cause prices at 
3 
higher market levels. The use of the mark-up model to describe pnce transmission IS 
dependent on three assumptions: a Leontief production function, constant returns to scale, and 
competitive markets (Heien, 1980). The use of the Leontief production technology implies that 
agricultural and marketing service inputs are used in fixed proportions. Constant returns to 
scale is equivalent to assuming constant marginal costs which implies that the volume moving 
through the system is not a relevant variable in the price transmission model. 
The mark-up model is extended to include imperfect information and search costs in 
a competitive market. The present model considers a problem of limited price information 
concerning a homogeneous product2• It is supposed that identical consumers know the 
distribution of prices charged in the market but do not know which retailer charges which 
price. This information may be obtained at a "search cost" which differs among consumers and 
is characterized by a density function F(s). 
The retailer's problem is to maximize profits, i.e. 
MaxR N(R)Rq(R) - N(R)(W+Z)q(R) = N(R)Mq(R) - N(R)Zq(R) 
where N(R) is the number of customers patronizing the retailer, R is the price charged by the 
retailer, q(R) is the quantity bought by the customer, W is the wholesale price, M is the 
marketing margin, Z is a vector of other marketing inputs. The first order condition for this 
maximization problem is: 
• 
It can be re-interpreted as a model of quality search if the quality of the commodity 
differs for a given price. 
4 
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aN R _ aq R = R R 
= ........"...-=
aR N aR q	 ..... M - Z-;:;R:--_---r'(-;';w~+--.Z)
If e is the elasticity of demand facing the retailer or 
e= - dlnN - '1](R)
dlnR 
where '1](R.)=-aq/aR.Rlq is the elasticity of the individual demand curve, then this condition 
can be rewritten as a profit maximizing retailer equating marginal revenue to marginal costs 
or 
w +	 ZR = 
1 _	 1 
e 
A kinked demand model implies different elasticities for price increases (e+) and price 
decreases (e"). Hence, retail prices will respond differently to wholesale price increases (W+) and 
to price decreases (W"). 
= w· + Z. R- = 
1 ' 1 ­
-
If for example e+ > eO, then the same change in wholesale prices at the optimum causes a 
different change in retail prices, i.e. IA R+ I > IA R I. 
A kinked demand model arises in competitive markets with search costs and imperfect 
information (Braverman, 1980; Stiglitz, 1987; Sibly, 1992; McMillan, Morgan, 1988). This 
theory has a strong appeal for developing countries where sellers on the food market are 
5 
seemingly undifferentiated and publicity for a particular seller is non existent. If a retailer 
raises its price, customers with low search costs may proceed to search for a lower-priced store. 
If a retailer lowers its price, it may sell more to its current customers, and more individuals 
who are searching products will decide to purchase there. But even if it became publicly 
known that some retailer had lowered its price, it might not become known which retailer 
had done so. The lack of information systems, measures of quality, grades and weight in food 
retailing markets in developing countries imply significant search costs for the customer. 
Three special cases of search costs are taken into consideration (St is the cost of the tth 
search): a. linear: St = S (and SI = 0); b. convex: St > ~-1 (SI > 0); c. concave: St < St-l (SI > 
0). Many of the costs of search are fixed: after going to a food retail market, the marginal costs 
of going to an additional retailer may be relatively small. But there are also increasing costs 
associated with search: time and money become increasingly scarce. On the other hand, 
agricultural products are also sold outside the official markets by street vendors. In this case, 
fixed search costs are less and variable search costs are more important. 
Along the lines of the search model developed by Stiglitz (1987), assume that there are 
L customers and N retailers, all charging a price R=R·. The share of customers for each 
retailer is LIN. If a retailer wants to raise its price, its low-search-cost customers will leave. 
The retailer that raises its price sells only to customers. Those individuals with search costs 
M = t [1 - F(s(R))] 
• 
>. 
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s < swill search for another retailer and F(s(R)) gives the fraction of individuals who search 
at each value of R. Differentiating this, the elasticity of demand is: 
f+(R *) = 11(R *) + f{O)q(R *)R * 
Stiglitz (1987) shows that in the case of search without replacement and 
a) linear search costs: 
f-(R *) = 11(R *) + 2(N - 1).j{O)R *q(R *)
N 
b) convex search costs: 
f-(R *) = 11(R *) + f{O)R *q(R *)
N - 1 
c) concave search costs: 
f-(R *) = 11(R *) + (N - 1)f{0)R *q(R *) 
The introduction of search costs generates different elasticities for a price increase than a price 
decrease and causes a kink in the demand curve. Hence, this model serves as an explanation 
for asymmetric price behavior. 
Several authors criticize the assumptions of the mark-up model. Wohlgenant and 
Haidacher (1989) research the fixed proportions of agricultural and marketing service inputs 
for major foods in the u.S. and show that farm-level derived demand elasticities are more than 
40 percent larger than those obtained by assuming fixed proportions. In a developing country 
context and for a wholesale-retail margin it can be argued that substitution between wholesale 
• 
products and marketing inputs is minor because of the relatively small amounts of marketing 
7 
service inputs required in retail marketing and the limited technology employed. Wohlgenant 
and Mullen (1987) argue that with both supply and demand shifts, no mark-up pricing 
relationship can depict accurately the relationship between retail and wholesale price. In the 
Zairean framework, it is expected that there will be shifts in the supply curve and changes in 
the wholesale price of the different commodities because of seasonal variation in production 
and changing road conditions while shifts in the demand curve and changes in the retail price 
occur because of variations in purchasing power and consumer preferences. Given the short 
period of analysis, we will assume that the latter shifts are less important and hence, that the 
4
•
5
•mark-up model is valid3•
3 Analysis of variability of retail prices, wholesale prices and marketing margins may 
provide some evidence on price responsiveness at different levels. In the case of instantaneous 
and symmetric transmission ofprice changes from one level to another, one would expect retail 
and wholesale prices to have similar variability. Variable retail prices with stable wholesale 
prices would seem to indicate that wholesale prices do not respond to retail price changes (Pick 
et al., 1990). Table 1 shows that retail prices are more variable than wholesale prices. 
4 It is difficult to assess demand shifts because of lack ofdata during that time period. An 
indication is that the real wages index in the public administration evolved from 22.4 in 1987 
and 1988 to 24.9 in 1989 (1975=100) and that the Gross Domestic Product grew from 1096.3 
in 1987 to 1120.8 million zaires in 1988 (expressed in 1970 zaires). Neither of these indicators 
show a large change. 
5 Results ofcausality tests would allow a decision on how to estimate the price transmission 
system: it can be estimated in a single equation if there is unidirectional causality while in the • 
case of bidirectional causality, a simultaneous system is appropriate. However, causality tests 
are not appropriate if price interactions are asymmetric because causality tests are based on 
linear models and asymmetric price transmission is a nonlinear process (Hahn, 1990). 
8 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 
A. Data 
Food prices on mne retail markets and five wholesale markets in Kinshasa were 
gathered by the division of markets, prices and rural credit and the K.U.Leuven-A.G.C.D. 
project in the Ministry of Agriculture after the implementation of the price liberalization 
program. Four of the surveyed markets have a wholesale and retail market. Continuous 
weekly prices are available from the first week of 1987 through the fourth week of 1989. The 
weekly price series are not deflated because the purpose of this analysis is to examine the 
asymmetric behavior of nominal prices and not relative prices. 
B. Estimation Procedures 
The Houck procedure (1977) to test for asymmetric behavior is used. In a mark-up 
model, the retail price is caused by the wholesale price and the estimated equation is6: 
n n n 
Rt-RO = I>)!i(~-~-JDup + L{3i(~-~-JDdo + "(lSi + aT + Ll1(Gt-GJ + €t 
;=0 i=O ;=0 
where R is the retail price, W is the wholesale price, Dup - 1 if Wt > W t -t and 0 otherwise, 
Ddo ... 1 if Wt < Wt-t and 0 otherwise, G is the price of gasoline, T is a trend variable, 51,2,3 
are seasonal dummies for first, second and third quarter, n is the number of lags, and t is the 
-

Because most weekly variables are integrated oforder one (1(1)) but are not co-integrated 
over levels, a specification without error correction tenn is appropriate. 
9 
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time period. The gasoline price, seasonal dummies and trend variable are used as proxies for 
changes in marketing costs. 
According to this equation, the sign of (Wt - Wt-J Dup, the period to period increase, 
should always be positive and the sign of (Wt -Wt-J Ddo, the period to period decrease, should 
always be negative. The coefficients (Xj and (3j should be positive (negative) when a positive 
(negative) net relationship exists between Rt and Wt The sum of the coefficients should equal • 
one if absolute price changes are completely transmitted. 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) techniques are used for estimation in this 
analysis. The use of SUR implies that the error terms are contemporaneously correlated. It can 
be hypothesized that random events such as weather, fuel shortage, strikes, etc. affect all 
products alike. Suppose there are N equations Yj "" Xj (3j + Ej where the subscript i refers to 
the ith equation. These equations can be written in matrix notation as Y· .. X· (3. + E·. 
Specifying the general equations in this way enables a test of the null hypothesis that the 
pricing structure in the Zairian food distribution sector is symmetrical: 
PI PI 
Ho: L (Xij = L (3ij for ) 1,... ,m 
i=O i=O 
versus the alternative: 
PI PI 
H1: L (X .. ¢ L (3 .. for j = 1,...,m 
i=O J] i=O J] 
where m is the number of products. A way to develop a test statistic for testing He against H 1 
is to use an extended version of the single equation F-test. Assuming the errors are normally 
• 
distributed, an expression for Af can be derived Gudge, 1988): 
10 
A= ~ F 
'f (y _ X~)'CL-l ~ 1)(y - X~)/(MT - K) - (J. MT-K) 
where the system of equations is: 
y = X{3+E 
and T is the number of observations, M is the number of equations, K is the number of 
regressors, J is the number of restrictions, I:~I is the covariance matrix, and 
It can be shown that the denominator converges in probability to one and hence can be 
omitted, leaving 
as a new operational statistic that has an approximate FO,MT-K) distribution Oudge, 1988). 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the price level and the number of weekly periods of increasing and 
decreasing prices for major agricultural products at the retail and wholesale level for the period 
1987 - 1989. The retail margin ranges from seventeen percent of the final retail price for maize 
in grains to fifty-four percent for peanuts in grain (compared to peanuts in shell). The margin 
• 
is largest for transformed products and smallest for the more standardized products. In general, 
" 
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almost the same number of periods of increasing and decreasing prices are found but the 
average price increase is significantly larger than the average price decrease, causing an upward 
trend in prices and reflecting an inflationary environment. 
Table 2 (in levels) and 3 (in differences) show the results for the asymmetry test using 
a seemingly unrelated regression model. Initially four lags were used in the regression. Most 
products show significant effects only for the contemporaneous and one period lagged price. 
Because of the high multicollinearity of contemporaneous and lagged prices and because of the 
fast turn-over by retailers7, it was decided to incorporate only one lag in the regression. To 
check the overall acceptability of the residual autocorrelation, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic is used. 
If significant auto-correlation was found, additional lags were incorporated based on a 
correlogram of the residuals. In that way, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic becomes insignificant for 
all products. 
All products show a significant influence (at the 10 percent level) of the increasing 
wholesale price on the retail price while only three retail prices out of nine are affected by 
price decreases at the wholesale level. The price increase is transmitted in the same week for 
all products. Six products, of which three are significant, have a negative sign for the lagged 
transmission, i.e. some retail prices are overshooting wholesale price increases. Almost the 
same results hold for the difference specification. Eight retail prices are influenced by 
increasing wholesale prices while only three products are significantly affected by decreasing 
wholesale prices. 
• 
Goossens et al. (1994) and Minten (1995) show that it takes the retailer on average 2.7 
to 6.2 days, depending on the product, to sell the products they bought on the wholesale market. 
12 
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Table 1:	 Mean and Standard Deviation of Price Levels, Number of Periods of Increasing 
and Decreasing Prices and Mean Nominal Price Increase and Decrease for Major 
Agricultural Products at the Retail and Wholesale Level in Kinshasa in the 
Period 1987 - 1989 (Weekly Prices) 
Product Price Level Increasing Prices Decreasing Prices 
Mean St. 
Deviat. 
Number Mean Number Mean 
Retail: 
White Beans 192.9 104.7 68 12.0 39 8.9 
Colored Beans 157.5 94.4 54 15.3 53 7.4 
Cassava Bandundu8 57.1 28.1 43 6.4 54 2.3 
Cassava Bas-Zaire 58.9 28.0 55 4.1 42 2.6 
Peanuts in shell 99.5 52.7 62 5.7 45 3.5 
Maize in grains 41.7 20.5 58 2.8 49 1.4 
Cassava flour 68.3 31.7 48 4.5 59 1.3 
Peanuts in grains 165.0 91.8 61 8.3 46 4.4 
Maize flour 93.8 45.6 62 6.8 45 4.5 
Wholesale: 
White Beans 136.2 70.1 59 14.4 48 11.9 
Colored Beans 120.4 61.4 58 12.1 49 7.4 
Cassava Bandundu 35.3 12.5 62 2.6 45 1.7 
Cassava Bas-Zaire 44.2 16.3 56 3.7 51 2.5 
Peanuts in shell 76.7 76.7 61 5.8 46 5.5 
Maize in grains 34.5 34.5 61 2.5 46 1.6 
• 
Cassava chips from Bandundu are considered to have a different quality than those from 
Bas-zaire because of the higher expected losses (the chips are more damaged from the longer 
trip in Bandundu than in Bas-zaire) and discoloration, different processing methods. 
13 
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Table 2:	 Results of the Regression of Weekly Retail Food Prices on Wholesale Prices and 
Other Variables during 1987 - 1989 in Kinshasa (Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression; the Values in Brackets are t-Ratios) 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: R, - Roo 
Maize grains Maize flour White Beans Colored Beans Cassava BDD 
Intercept 2.30 -7.21 12.12 4.79 1.42 
(1.21) (-1.56) (1.77) (0.45) (0.39) 
Wup
• 
0.95 0.81 0.63 0.68 1.07 
(7.19) (2.57) (8.14) (4.51) (4.09) 
WUP•.! -0.34 0.51 -0.26 -0.11 0.69 
(-2.11) (1.44) (-2.16) (-0.76) (1.75) 
Woo
• 
-0.44 0.75 0.20 0.54 0.98 
(-1.72) (1.23) (1.11) (2.21) (2.26) 
Woo•.! 0.82 0.42 0.01 0.07 -0.13 
(3.25) (0.69) (0.10) (0.24) (-0.32) 
5, -2.30 -0.33 -4.94 3.24 -0.18 
(-2.13) (-0.13) (-1.01) (0.54) (-0.10) 
52 -5.00 -4.66 3.80 1.24 -1.16 
(-3.72) (-1.47) (0.70) (0.23) (-0.52) 
53 -3.27 -7.42 -14.46 -17.84 -2.84 
(-3.46) (-2.91) (-3.37) (-3.25) (-1.36) 
Gas, 0.05 0.39 -0.53 -1.42 0.Q2 
(1.08) (3.52) (-1.79) (-4.62) (0.13) 
Trend, -0.14 -0.02 -0.35 0.33 -0.86 
(-2.32) (-0.13) (-0.91) (0.92) (-3.97) 
R", 0.39 0.41 0.72 0.72 0.42 
(4.52) (4.35) (10.90) (7.40) (4.93) 
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 
Ljung-Box Q-nat. 6.16 3.83 2.21 2.94 5.61 
(prob.) (0.40) (0.70) (0.89) (0.82) (0.47) 
ARCH F-nat. 1.50 0.44 1.13 0.65 1.08 
(prob.) (0.19) (0.85) (0.34) (0.68) (0.38) 
BDD - Bandundu; BZ - Bas-Zaire
 
5,,52,53are seasonal dummies for months 1 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9 respectively.
 
Transformed retail produet5 are compared to the raw material wholesale product.
 
-
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Table 2: (continued) 
Independent Dependent variable: R, -~ 
variables 
Peanuts in shell Peanuts in grains Cassava Flour Cassava BZ 
Intercept 4.96 11.25 -8.70 8.10 
(1.46) (2.58) (-3.49) (2.33) 
W"P, 0.31 0.64 0.35 0.95 
(2.23) (3.98) (1.94) (5.82) 
W"PI . 1 0.08 -0.17 -0.10 -0.41 
(0.61) (-1.05) (-0.42) (-2.34) 
Wdo, 0.07 0.29 0.31 0.43 
(0.43) (1.43) (1.07) (1.59) 
Wdo ,•• 0.07 -0.16 -0.08 -0.13 
(0.45) (-0.81) (-0.28) (-0.50) 
5. -3.71 -4.28 2.37 -5.71 
(-1.40) (-1.45) (1.84) (-3.01) 
52 -5.79 -3.51 -0.24 -5.56 
(-2.19) (-1.25) (-0.17) (-3.00) 
53 -0.16 ·0.79 -4.74 -2.75 
(-0.07) (0.31) (-3.26) (-1.55) 
Gas, 0.14 -0.04 0.19 -0.17 
(1.13) (-0.29) (2.28) (-1.98) 
Trend. -0.36 -0.56 0.34 -0.39 
(-2.46) (-2.88) (2.51) (-2.55) 
R,., 0.59 1.11 0.50 0.70 
(6.89) (11.20) (6.50) (6.97) 
R,.2 -0.35 0.14 
(-3.84) (1.20) 
R,.3 -0.16 
(-1.35) 
R,.. -0.02 
(-0.14) 
R,.5 0.17 
(1.71) 
R2 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 
Ljung-Box Q-stat 2.17 9.99 5.55 8.56 
(prob.) (0.90) (0.15) (0.47) (0.20) 
ARCH F-stat. 1.49 4.84 0.14 5.28 
(prob.) (0.19) (0.00) (0.99) (0.00) 
BOD - Bandundu; BZ - Bas-Zaire
 
5\. 52. ~ are seasonal dummies for months 1 to 3, 4 to 6, 7 to 9 respectively.
 
Transformed retail produet5 are compared to the raw material wholesale product.
 
-
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Table 3:	 Results of the Regression of First Differences of Weekly Retail Food Prices on 
First Differences in Wholesale Prices during 1987 - 1989 in Kinshasa (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression; the Values in Brackets are t-Ratios) 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: R, - R,'I 
Maize grains Maize £lour White Beans Colored Beans Cassava BDD 
Intercept -0.79 -5.10 3.66 -2.01 3.75 
(0.49) (-0.99) (0.58) (-0.18) (0.88) 
WUP, - WUp,.• 0.89 0.53 0.54 0.41 0.97 
(6.44) (1.51) (6.69) (3.47) (2.93) 
WUP'.I - WUP,.2 0.13 0.61 0.04 0.22 0.46 
(1.18) (2.15) (0.81) (2.19) (2.04) 
Wdo, _Wdo,.• 
-0.19 1.33 0.10 0.58 0.24 
(-0.69) (1.93) (0.52) (2.18) (0.51) 
Wdo,.•_Wdo'.2 0.25 0.97 -0.00 0.21 0.17 
(1.40) (2.10) (-0.04) (1.18) (0.64) 
51 -2.90 -0.72 -6.81 0.52 -2.55 
(-2.60) (-0.25) (-1.33) (0.09) (.1.24) 
52 -0.21 4.71 0.02 3.44 -2.27 
(-0.17) (1.52) (0.00) (0.60) (-0.91) 
5) 0.14 0.97 -8.89 -8.69 -1.66 
(0.16) (0.43) (-2.00) (-1.63) (-0.71) 
Gas, - Gas,.• 0.16 0.44 -0.54 -1.63 0.08 
(2.71) (3.06) (-1.53) (-4.52) (0.49) 
Trend, -0.03 0.03 -0.21 -0.17 -0.36 
(-0.49) (-0.20) (.0.48) (.0.45) (-1.58) 
R,.I· R,.2 -0.42 -0.25 
(-4.40) (-2.81) 
R,.2 - R,.) -0.30 
(-3.25) 
R,... - R,.5 -0.27 
(-2.83) 
R,'5 - R,-6 -0.41 
(-3.75) 
R2 0.32 0.36 0.47 0.38 0.35 
Ljung-Box Q-stat. 3.09 9.40 4.78 5.41 5.33 
(prob.) (0.80) (0.15) (0.57) (0.49) (0.50) 
ARCH F-test 4.65 0.42 1.75 0.60 1.85 
(prob.) (0.00) (0.85) (0.12) (0.72) (0.10) 
BDD - Bandundu; BZ - Bas-Zaire
 
5.. 52' 5) are seasonal dummies for months 1 to 3. 4 to 6, 7 to 9 respectively.
 
Transformed retail products are compared to the raw material wholesale product.
 
-
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Table 3: (continued) 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: R, - R,.I 
Peanuts in shell Peanuts in grain Cassava BZ Cassava Flour 
Intercept 0.44 -0.35 5043 2.06 
(0.13) (-0.09) (1.53) (0.68) 
wop. -W"P,.I 0.11 0.46 0.78 0.55 
(0.75) (2.93) (5.20) (2.37) 
W"P,.1 - wop•.2 0.Q3 0.00 0.26 -0.14 
(0041) (0.00) (2.27) (-0.86) 
Wdo, _Wdo~1 0.07 0.25 0.46 0.14 
(0.36) (1.17) (1.71) (0040) 
Wdo•.I_Wdo'.2 0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.13 
(0.36) (-0.14) (0.85) (-0.67) 
51 -2.04 -4.50 -3.91 -0.64 
(-0.71) (-1.47) (-2.06) (-0045) 
52 -1.06 -0.39 -3.47 -1.98 
(-0.39) (-0.13) (-2.00) (-1.13) 
53 1.08 0.29 -0.94 -1.75 
(0.43) (0.11) (0.56) (-1.04) 
Gas. - Gas" 1 0.05 -0.18 -0.10 -0.20 
(0.34) (-1.21) (-1.25) (-1.78) 
Trend, 0.02 -0.Q1 -0.30 0.04 
(0.16) (-0.06) (-1.95) (0.26) 
R,'I - R,.2 0.28 -0.17 
(2.96) (-1.81) 
R,.. - R,.s -0.27 
(-2.27) 
R2 0.06 0.31 0.31 0040 
Ljung-Box Q-stat. 8.22 10.72 4.80 8.59 
(prob.) (0.22) (0.10) (0.57) (0.20) 
ARCH Test 1.27 3.18 8.37 0.79 
(prob.) (0.27) (0.01) (0.00) (0.58) 
BDD - Bandundu; BZ - Bas-Zaire
 
51.52,53are seasonal dummies for months 1 to 3. 4 to 6,7 to 9 respectively.
 
Transformed retail products are compared to the raw material wholesale product.
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Price transmission elasticities are calculated at the mean for the wholesale-retail price 
spread using the level specification (fable 4). The elasticity of price transmission measures 
price responsiveness between market levels. It is defined as the responsiveness of retail prices 
(R) to a one percent change in the wholesale price (W) as seen by: 
aR W 
T1 = aWR 
To calculate the change in retail price for a change in wholesale prIces, the 
contemporaneous and one period lagged coefficients are taken into account. An F-test is 
conducted on the hypothesis that there is symmetric behavior for the nine equations in the 
SUR model simultaneously. The results indicate a rejection of the hypothesis of symmetric 
behavior (F: 5.4440; Prob >F·: 0.0001). F-values are calculated for the specified hypothesis for 
the nine products separately (fable 4). In eight out of nine cases, the price transmission 
elasticity for price increases is larger than the elasticity for price decreases and in six out of 
nine cases, significant asymmetric behavior is found9• Of the nine products, only beans and 
cassava flour are described by symmetric behavior. Peanuts and cassava from Bandundu are the 
most significantly asymmetric products. Goossens (1994) argues that the quality of beans is 
relatively uniform compared to other products. Peanuts at the wholesale level are sold in shell 
making it difficult to evaluate quality and quantity as an unknown percentage of shells is 
empty and grains can be moldy or damaged by insects. The quality of cassava from Bandundu 
is more uncertain than cassava from Bas-Zaire because of the unknown impact of greater 
-

Using the difference equation, six out of nine show significant asymmetric behavior 
(reversed asymmetric behavior is found for maize flour). 
18 
9 
transport damage. Hence, a possible explanation for asymmetric behavior might be that some 
products are more homogenous than other products such that search costs are less and that 
elasticities of price increases are equal to elasticities of price decreases. 
Table 4:	 Elasticities of Retail - Wholesale Price Transmission for Major Agricultural 
Products under Rising and Falling Prices and Results for the Test of Symmetric 
Behavior (Kinshasa, Weekly, 1987 - 1989) 
Elasticity F-test 
Increasing Decreasing F-value Prob>F
• 
Conclusion 
White Beans 
Colored Beans 
Cassava Bandundu 
Cassava Bas-Zaire 
Cassava flour 
Peanuts in shell 
Peanuts in grains 
Maize in grains 
Maize flour 
0.261 
0.436 
1.088 
0.405 
0.129 
0.300 
0.219 
0.506 
0.486 
0.148 
0.467 
0.525 
0.225 
0.119 
0.108 
0.060 
0.315 
0.431 
2.50 
0.10 
16.81 
4.92 
0.00 
10.38 
11.76 
5.64 
5.30 
0.11 
0.75 
0.00 
0.03 
0.96 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
Symmetric 
Symmetric 
Asymmetric 
Asymmetric 
Symmetric 
Asymmetric 
Asymmetric 
Asymmetric 
Asymmetric 
For most products, the price of gasoline does not significantly affect the retail margin 
except for white and colored beans, where the coefficient has a counter-intuitive sign and for 
transformed products (cassava flour and maize flour). Milling of maize grains and cassava chips 
are mainly done by means of mechanical mills, which require fuel. The elasticity of the retail 
price of the transformed product with respect to the gasoline price (evaluated at the mean) is 
0.13 and 0.19 for cassava flour and maize flour respectively. 
• 
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v. CONCLUSIONS
 
The price transmission between wholesale level and retail level is analyzed in Kinshasa 
(Zaire) to test for asymmetric behavior. The hypothesis of symmetric behavior for all products 
simultaneously as measured by an F-test is rejected. All retail prices are significantly affected 
by wholesale price increases while only half of them are affected by wholesale price decreases. 
Six out of nine products show significant asymmetric behavior. This asymmetry can be 
explained by search costs incurred by the customer. It is shown that the existence of search 
costs can generate kinked demand curves in competitive markets which implies a different 
price elasticity for price increases and price decreases. Products characterized by lower search 
costs because of more homogeneity and standardization behave symmetrically while other 
products with higher search costs behave asymmetrically. 
Policy implications imply efforts to reduce search costs. A first implication concerns 
the setting of grades and standards. This can be an important function of collectives and 
cooperatives and could take a number of forms such as brand names, guarantees and bonding 
of participants. Second, public gathering and dissemination of information and legally 
established mandatory reporting systems are likely to improve market performance. Studies 
that examine the effects of increasing consumer information on food prices provide evidence 
that credible comparative price information reduces price dispersion and average retail prices 
in a metropolitan area (Marion, 1986). Promising experiences with agricultural market 
information systems in Africa are under way in Mali and Cameroon. As this analysis only 
• 
focuses on the Kinshasa market in Zaire, the extension of this study is obvious. It would be 
20 
useful if studies could be done on more products, other urban markets, other countries, and 
for longer time periods. 
-

..
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